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A PROFILE IN COURAGE:
THE BIPARTISAN CAMPAIGN REFORM ACT OF 2002
AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT
INTRODUCTION
Today the challenge of political courage looms larger than ever
before .... Our political life is becoming so expensive, so mecha-
nized and so dominated by professional politicians and public rela-
tions men that the idealist who dreams of independent
statesmanship is rudely awakened by the necessities of election and
accomplishment. '
Senator John McCain (R-AZ) gained national notoriety with his
presidential run in 2000.2 Although his bid for the presidency ulti-
mately failed, he brought much needed national attention to the issue
of campaign finance reform.3 Colorful as always, the former Vietnam
POW swore during his presidential run that "we will have blood all
over the floor [of the Senate] until we accede to the demands of the
American people to be represented in Washington again."' 4 While it
did not take blood to finally pass campaign finance reform, it took
nearly six years of courageous persistence by Senators McCain and
Russel Feingold. 5 Campaign finance reform has proven to be a "black
hole" for legislative regulation and remedies for nearly two decades.
It represents a truly unique public policy problem, because "535 ex-
perts (435 members of the House of Representatives and 100 Sena-
tors) each has his or her own ideas about what, if anything, is wrong
with the system" and how to correct those wrongs.6 Additionally,
each of these 535 experts has a personal stake in the issue of campaign
finance reform: the election system has been perverted in such a man-
1. JOHN F. KENNEDY. PROFILES IN COURAGE 18 (1955).
2. Senator McCain challenged Governor George W. Bush in several Republican State Pri-
mary races and won in seven states before ultimately dropping out of the race and endorsing the
future president. Elaine S. Povich, Bush, McCain to Meet, But not Retreat. NEWSDAY, May 6,
2000, at A7.
3. Money or Blood on Senate Floor. Editorial. N.Y. DAILY NEWS. Jan. 23, 2001. at 30.
4. Id.
5. Allison Mitchell. Campaign Finance Bill Wins Final Approval in Congress and Bush Says
He'll Sign It: Vote is 600 to 40: Opponents of Measure say they will push Battle into Courts, TIMES.
Mar. 21. 2002, at Al. Russel Feingold is a Democrat representing Wisconsin.
6. DIANE DWYRE & VICIORIA A. FARRAR-MYERS. LEGISLATIvE LABYRINTH: CONGRESS
AND CAMPAIGN FINANCE REFORM 3-4 (2001).
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ner that the very continuation of their livelihood is now dependent
upon how much money they can raise to fund their re-election cam-
paigns. This Comment will clarify recent Supreme Court and Con-
gressional efforts to reform the manner in which Congressional
elections are funded and regulated in the United States.
The main focus of this Comment is the various Congressional and
Supreme Court responses to the Party Expenditure Provision of the
Federal Election Campaign Act of 19717 (FECA), which regulates the
manner in which political parties may contribute and spend money in
support of a candidate for federal office.8 Part II of this Comment
provides a background to the interests at issue in campaign finance
reform jurisprudence, including the history of legislation enacted by
Congress to regulate the allocation of money in federal elections, and
the Supreme Court's interpretation of these laws in light of the First
Amendment's guarantee to free speech.9 Additionally, Part II ex-
plores the distinctions between issue and express advocacy, hard and
soft money, and how the major political parties have used these vari-
ous funding mechanisms. 10 Part III summarizes the Supreme Court's
decision in Federal Election Commission v. Colorado Republican
Campaign Committee (Colorado II). Il Part IV analyzes the Colorado
H rationale, asserting that the Supreme Court made a political realiza-
tion that political parties often act to circumvent the FECA limita-
tions.' 2 Additionally, Part IV argues for greater Congressional
regulation of money in federal elections by asserting that the act of
contributing and spending money constitutes conduct, rather than
speech, under First Amendment jurisprudence. 13 Finally, Part V ad-
dresses the impact of the Court's decision on the recently enacted Bi-
partisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002.14
II. BACKGROUND
This portion of the Comment provides the necessary background to
fully understand this complex issue, particularly the analysis 15 and im-
7. 18 U.S.C. § 608 (1970) (repealed 1976). Those sections of the FECA that withstood the
Buckley constitutional challenge are codified in 2 U.S.C. § 441a (2001).
8. See infra notes 100-108 and accompanying text.
9. See infra notes 15-53 and accompanying text.
10. See infra notes 54-99 and accompanying text.
11. 121 S. Ct. 2351 (2001): see infra notes 134-216 and accompanying text.
12. See infra notes 217-272 and accompanying text.
13. See infra notes 241-265 and accompanying text.
14. See infra notes 272-335 and accompanying text.
15. See infra notes 217-272 and accompanying text.
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pact t 6 sections. Included are the current contribution and expenditure
limits under federal law' 7 and the Supreme Court's landmark decision
of Buckley v. Valeo.18 Additionally, common campaign finance terms,
such as issue and express advocacy and hard and soft money, are ex-
plored in depth. 19 Also included is the Party Expenditure Provision, 20
the chief focus of the Comment, as well as the Supreme Court's 1996
ruling in the Colorado v. Federal Election Commission line of
decisions. 2t
A. Federal Election Campaign Act (FECA)22
Throughout the 1970s, political fundraising in the United States
went largely unregulated. 23 Congress passed the FECA 24 in an at-
tempt to curtail rising campaign costs and to solidify reporting re-
quirements. However, the clear inadequacies of the FECA were
nationally exposed during the Watergate scandal, when President
Nixon's campaign raised over fifty million dollars, much of that in ille-
gal contributions designed to circumvent limitations set forth in the
FECA.25 In the aftermath of the scandal, Congress moved swiftly to
curtail the underlying political fundraising abuses that nearly crippled
both the country and the presidency. 26 This action resulted in a set of
1974 Amendments to the FECA.27 The Amendments set forth dollar
limitations on contributions by individuals, parties, political action
committees (PACs), 28 and corporations. The Amendments also lim-
16. See infra notes 273-335 and accompanying text.
17. See infra notes 22-31 and accompanying text.
18. 424 U.S. 1 (1975); see infra notes 32-53 and accompanying text.
19. See infra notes 22-133 and accompanying text.
20. See infra notes 100-108 and accompanying text.
21. See infra notes 109-216 and accompanying text.
22. 18 U.S.C. § 608 (1970) (repealed 1976).
23. CAMPAIGN FINANCE REFORM: A SOURCEBOOK 27 (Anthony Corrado et al. eds.. The
Brookings Institution 1997).
24. 18 U.S.C. § 608 (1970) (repealed 1976).
25. Corrado, supra note 23, at 32. For a detailed account of these abuses, see generally. S.
REP. No. 93-981 (1974).
26. Corrado, supra note 23, at 32.
27. 18 U.S.C. § 608 (1970 & Supp. IV 1974) (repealed 1976). Those sections of the FECA that
withstood the Buckley constitutional challenge are codified in 2 U.S.C. § 441a (2001).
28. Frank J. Sorauf, What Buckley Wrought, in IF BUCKLEY FELL: A FIRST AMENDMENT
BLUEPRINT FOR REGULATING MONEY IN POLITICS 12 (E. Joshua Rosenkranz ed.. 1999). The
FECA did not create PACs. Id. at 13. They have existed in "American electoral politics since
1943, when organized labor founded the original [Political Action Committee]." Id. "But before
1974. PACs operated in the shadow of the legendary 'fat cats,' the wealthy individuals who gave
up to several million dollars to presidential candidates." Id. Congress was successfully able to
restrict the monetary influence of the "fat cats" through the FECA. Id. However. in doing so.
Congress actually enhanced the role of PACs. Id.
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ited expenditures by parties, PACs, corporations, and candidates. 29
Additionally, the Amendments set new reporting and disclosure re-
quirements, created a system for the public financing of Presidential
campaigns, and established the Federal Election Commission 30 (FEC)
to administer the FECA.31 The broad scope of the FECA Amend-
ments made the legislation destined for confrontation with the First
Amendment and the Supreme Court.
B. Buckley v. Valeo
Opponents of congressional campaign regulation quickly chal-
lenged the Amendments in the landmark Supreme Court decision
Buckley v. Valeo32 in 1976. A wide group of plaintiffs, composed of
federal officeholders and candidates, 33 several potential contribu-
tors,3 4 and others, challenged various provisions of the Amendments
as violations of the First Amendment's guarantee of free speech. 35
The complaint sought a declaratory judgment that the provisions were
unconstitutional and an injunction preventing the enforcement of the
provisions. 36 The district court directed the case to the United States
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia where that court re-
jected the plaintiffs' constitutional challenges and upheld the provi-
sions of the FECA. 37
[I]n allowing a PAC to contribute five times as much as an individual donor ($5,000
versus $1,000) and in failing to limit the total amount that any one PAC could contrib-
ute to all candidates and parties combined as it did for individuals ($25,000 per year),
Congress created incentives for PAC proliferation.
Sorauf. supra at 13. In fact. "[b]etween 1974 and 1984 the number of PACs registered with the
new Federal Election Commission (FEC) increased from 608 to 4,009. and their contributions to
candidates for Congress rose from $22.6 million in the 1976 cycle to $111.5 million in 1984." Id.
"They accounted for 19 percent of the receipts of congressional candidates in 1976. and by 1984
their contributions totaled 27 percent." Id. See generally THOMAS GAIS. IMPROPER INFLUENCE:
CAMPAIGN FINANCE LAw. POLITICAL INTEREST GROUPS. AND THE PROBLEM OF EQUALITY
(1996) (giving an exhaustive study of the role of PACs on the American political system).
29. 18 U.S.C. § 608 (1970 & Supp. IV 1974) (repealed 1976).
30. See generally BROOKS JACKSON. BROKEN PROMISE: WHY THE FEDERAL ELECTiON COM-
MISSION FAILED (1990) (discussing various problems with the FEC and offering recommenda-
tions for reform).
31. 18 U.S.C. § 608 (1970 & Supp. IV 1974) (repealed 1976).
32. 424 U.S. 1 (1976).
33. Id. at 7. A United States Presidential Candidate and Senator James Buckley of New York.
who were up for reelection, were included as plaintiffs. Id.
34. Id. at 8. The Committee for a Constitutional Presidency McCarthy '76. the Conservative
Party of the State of New York, and the Mississippi Republican Party were also included as
plaintiffs. Id.
35. Id. at 11.
36. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 9.
37. Id. at 10. The D.C. Circuit held one provision unconstitutionally vague and overbroad.
Id. at 11 n.7.
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Opponents appealed to the United States Supreme Court, where
they argued that the limitations on the use of money for political pur-
poses constituted a restriction of communication that violated the
First Amendment. 38 The appellants employed the argument that the
modern setting required the expenditure of money in order to achieve
meaningful political communications. 39 The appellants also raised
constitutional challenges to provisions of the FECA, including the re-
porting and disclosure provisions, as a violation of their right to free-
dom of association.40
The Court established the foundation for its ruling by stating that
the contribution and expenditure limitations of the Act "operate[d] in
an area of the most fundamental First Amendment [a]ctivities. ' '4 1
Further, in recognition of the fundamental importance of public dis-
cussion and debate on the qualifications of candidates, the Court
stated that the First Amendment seeks "to assure [the] unfettered in-
terchange of ideas for the bringing about of political and social
changes desired by the people. '4 2 The Court also rejected the appel-
lees' arguments that the contribution and expenditure of money was
conduct or that the regulations were a valid time, place, and manner
regulation, rather than pure speech, and therefore should be subject
to a lesser degree of judicial review. 43
As part of its decision, the Court upheld the contribution limitations
as only a "marginal restriction upon the contributor's ability to engage
in free communication. '44 The Court reasoned that a contribution
served as merely a general expression of support for the candidate and
their views, rather than a direct communication of their underlying
basis for support.45 In justifying the contribution limitations, the
38. Id. at 11.
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 14.
42. Id. (quoting Roth v. United States. 354 U.S. 476. 484 (1957)).
43. Id. at 16. Had the Court characterized the limitations as content-neutral symbolic con-
duct, the FECA would have been subjected to a lesser form of scrutiny. Id. Under Supreme
Court precedent at the time, United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968), would have applied.
The Court also found FECA different from the time, place, and manner regulation jurispru-
dence, because FECA imposed "direct quantity restrictions on political communication and as-
sociation by persons, groups, candidates, and political parties in addition to any reasonable time,
place. and manner regulations otherwise imposed." Buckley, 424 U.S. at 18. Under the time.
place, and manner argument, the appellees would have been required to show that FECA was a
reasonable regulation that did not discriminate on the basis of viewpoint and was aimed at ad-
vancing an important governmental interest that was unrelated to the restriction of communica-
tion. Id.
44. Id. at 20-21.
45. Id. at 21.
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Court stated the limitations did not interfere with communication be-
cause the quantity of the contribution did not actually increase the
level of communication. 46 The Court held that the contribution limi-
tations were narrowly tailored to serve the government's compelling
interest in preventing corruption or the appearance of corruption.47
The Court, however, also ruled that the expenditure limitations
were unconstitutional because they violated the appellants' freedom
of expression.48 The Court distinguished expenditure limitations from
contributions by stating that the expenditure limitations "represent
substantial, rather than merely theoretical, restraints on the quantity
and diversity of political speech. '49 The Court ruled that independent
expenditure limitations could not be justified by the government's
purported interest in preventing corruption or the appearance of cor-
ruption, 50 or in equalizing the relative ability of individuals and groups
to influence an election. 51 Further, the Court stated that independent
and candidate expenditure limitations "place substantial and direct re-
strictions on the ability of candidates, citizens and associations to en-
gage in protected political expression, restrictions that the First
Amendment cannot tolerate. '52
While subjecting both contribution and expenditure limitations to
strict scrutiny, the distinction created by the Court established that
restrictions on contributions require a somewhat less compelling justi-
fication than required for expenditure restrictions. 53
46. Id. Contributions were described as a mere signal of support which has little speech value
and whose message does not depend upon the size of the contribution. See E. Joshua Rosen-
kranz, Introduction, in IF BUCKLEY FELL: A FIRST AMENDMENT BLUEPRINT FOR REGULATING
MONEY IN POLITICS 2 (E. Joshua Rosenkranz ed., 1999).
47. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 29.
48. Id. at 51.
49. Id. at 19. The Court found expenditures to be "much more akin to direct speech, because
every dollar spent will actually increase 'the number of issues discussed, the depth of their explo-
ration, and the size of the audience reached."' Rosenkranz, supra note 46, at 2.
50. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 45. But cf John C. Bonifaz et a., Challenging Buckley v. Valco: A
Legal Strategy, 33 AKRON L. REv. 39. 43 (1999) (arguing that freeing elected officials from the
pressures of fundraising so as to allow them to better carry out their duties without interference
is a new compelling governmental interest).
51. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 48-49. The Court stated that the concept of restricting some elements
of our society in order to enhance other elements was "wholly foreign to the First Amendment.
which was designed 'to secure the widest possible dissemination of information from diverse and
antagonistic sources,' and 'to assure unfettered interchange of ideas for the bringing about of
political and social changes desired by the people."' Id. (quoting New York Times Co. v. Sulli-
van, 376 U.S. 254, 266, 269 (1964)).
52. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 58-59.
53. Nixon v. Shrink Mo. Gov't PAC, 528 U.S. 377. 387 (2000) (citing Fed. Election Comm'n v.
Mass. Citizens for Life, 479 U.S. 238, 259-60 (1986). "It has, in any event, been plain ever since
Buckley that contribution limits would more readily clear hurdles before them." Nixon, 528 U.S.
at 387. See also Colo. Republican Fed. Campaign Comm. v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 518 U.S.
[Vol. 52:83
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C. Issue Advocacy and Express Advocacy Restrictions
Developing from the need for a line between election spending,
which may be regulated, and general political spending, which may
not be regulated, came the judicially-created issue advocacy versus ex-
press advocacy distinction. 54 Prior to their First Amendment chal-
lenges, the appellants in Buckley had challenged the expenditure
limitations as unconstitutionally vague.55 The expenditure limitations
withstood the challenge because the Court defined the restrictions as
only applicable to expenditures that "in express terms advocat[ed] the
election or defeat of a clearly identified candidate for federal office. ''56
Thus, this narrow definition defines the only types of advertisements
that may be regulated by the government as election spending.57 The
Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002 broadens this definition to
allow increased regulation and bans certain issue advocacy advertise-
ments prior to an election. 58
On the other side of the spectrum are advertisements that do not fit
the previously mentioned definition and whose chief purpose is issue
advocacy.59 This type of activity can include television advertisements
and mass mailings urging the support or defeat of legislation, initia-
tives, referendum, or general issues. 60 While advertisements contain-
ing words of express advocacy are subject to reporting and disclosure
requirements, the current law provides very little regulation for issue
advocacy advertisements. 61  Additionally, issue advocacy advertise-
604. 610 (1996) (stating that the regulations the Court has generally found constitutional im-
posed contribution limits).
54. Richard Briffault, Drawing the Line Between Elections and Politics, in IF BUCKLEY FEiL:
A FIRST AMENDMENi BLUEPRINT FOR REGULATION MONEY IN POLITICS 123 (E. Joshua Rosen-
kranz ed., 1999).
55. Buckles'. 424 U.S. at 40-41.
56. Id. at 44. The regulation had defined 'clearly identified' as requiring "that the candidate's
name. photograph or drawing, or other unambiguous reference to his identity appear as part of
the communication." Id. at 44 n.51. The Court's construction would have required a communi-
cation to use terms advocating defeat or election, such as -'vote for." "elect." "suppori." etc. Id.
at 44 n.52.
57. Briffault, supra note 54.
58. Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002, 107 Pub. L. No. 155. § 201 (2002).
59. Briffault, supra note 54.
60. Bradley A. Smith. Soft Money, Hard Realities: The Constitutional Prohibition on a Soft
Money Ban. 24 J. LEGIS. 179, 181 (1998).
61. Briffault, supra note 54. at 122. An example of the use of this tool is a Montana television
advertisement about 1996 congressional incumbent Bill Yellowtail. The "issue" advertisement
stated:
Who is Bill Yellowtail? He preaches family values, but he took a swing at his wife.
Yellowtail's explanation? He 'only slapped her.' but her nose was broken. He talks
law and order, but is himself a convicted criminal. And though he talks about protect-
ing children. Yellowtail failed to make his own child support payments. then voted
2002]
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ments are generally funded with unregulated "soft money. ' 62 The use
of issue advocacy advertisements in federal campaigns first exploded
during the 1996 federal elections.63 Prompted by a 1995 FEC ruling,64
major party issue advertisements equaled nearly $110 million in 1995-
1996.65 Currently, the only regulation of issue advocacy is an FEC
requirement that they be financed by 65% hard money and 35% soft
money in presidential election years and 60% hard money and 40%
soft money in non-presidential years. 66 The Bipartisan Campaign Re-
form Act of 2002 bans the use of unregulated soft money to fund issue
advertisements and also narrows the definition of issue advocacy. 67
D. Hard Money and Soft Money
Today, direct contributions and expenditures made independently
of a political party or committee, on a federal candidate's behalf, are
commonly referred to as "hard money. '6s Currently, individuals may
directly contribute only $1000 to a candidate per election, 69 $20,000 to
a national party, 70 and $5000 to a PAC.71 In total, an individual may
against child support enforcement. Call Bill Yellowtail and tell him we don't approve
of his wrongful behavior. Call ....
Id. at 121.
This "attack ad" of a congressional incumbent, couched in a child support advertisement, is not
subject to any regulation under current campaign regulation jurisprudence. Id. at 122.
A similar type of advertisement run by the Democratic National Committee (DNC) in 1996
promoted President Clinton:
Announcer: Protect families. For millions of working families, President Clinton cut
taxes. The Dole/Gingrich budget tried to raise taxes on eight million. The Dole/Ging-
rich budget would've slashed Medicare $270 billion, cut scholarships. The President
defended our values, protected Medicare. And now a tax cut of $1,500 a year for the
first two years of college, most community colleges [are] free. Help adults go back to
school. The President's plan protects our values.
DWYRE. supra note 6, at 25.
62. Briffault, supra note 54, at 122. For an explanation of soft money see infra notes 82-99 and
accompanying text.
63. Corrado, supra note 23, at 227.
64. The FEC ruled that "the Republican National Committee ... could use soft money to
partially defray the costs of advertising that combined discussion of issues with criticism of Presi-
dent Clinton by name." Richard Briffault, The Political Parties and Campaign Finance Reform,
100 COLUM. L. REV. 620, 632 (2000).
65. Id. "According to an analysis by the Annenberg Public Policy Center, in 1998 at least
seventy-seven organizations spent an estimated $275 to $340 million on 423 issue ads broadcast
via television or radio." Anthony Corrado, On the Issue of Issue Advocacy: A Comment. 85 VA.
L. REV. 1803, 1804 (1999).
66. Briffault, supra note 64, at 633.
67. Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002, supra note 58, at § 101.
68. Corrado, supra note 23, at 5.
69. 2 U.S.C. § 441a(a)(1)(A) (2001).
70. 2 U.S.C. § 441a(a)(1)(B) (2001).
71. 2 U.S.C. § 441a(a)(1)(C) (2001).
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contribute no more than $25,000 per election cycle. 72 The law limits
contribution levels for political committees, including parties and
PACs, to $5000 to a candidate,73 $15,000 to a national party,74 and
$5000 to another political committee. 75 Additionally, the law equates
coordinated expenditures, those "expenditures made ... in coopera-
tion, consultation or concert, with, or at the request or suggestion of, a
candidate, his authorized political committees, or their agents," with
contributions; such expenditures also fall under the hard money defi-
nition. 76 The amount of coordinated expenditures by a party allowed
under the FECA in an election for the office of Senator or Represen-
tative is the greater of two cents multiplied by the voting age popula-
tion of the State or $20,000.7 7  Independent and candidate
expenditures are still unregulated sources of hard money.7s In the
2000 federal election cycle, the FEC reported that $741 million in hard
money was spent.79 This includes $275.2 million raised by the Demo-
cratic Party and $465.8 million raised by the Republican Party.80
Under the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002, individuals will
be allowed to contribute $2000 to a candidate per election cycle.,'
"Soft money" is money that affects federal elections and, therefore,
would be thought to be regulated under the FECA. However, "due to
statutory definition, administrative action, or judicial decision, [such
soft monies] technically fall outside of the FECA's scope."'82 Under
the concept of federalism, the FECA only regulates federal elections.
It has not always been easy, however, to distinguish between funds
being used to influence federal elections and those being used to influ-
ence state elections.8 3 The problem initially arose when party com-
mittees undertook campaign efforts to aid both federal and state
candidates at the same time.8 4 In the late 1970s, party committees
asked the FEC to allow them to use unregulated funds to partially
72. 2 U.S.C. § 441a(a)(3) (2001).
73. 2 U.S.C. § 441a(a)(2)(A) (2001).
74. 2 U.S.C. § 441a(a)(2)(B) (2001).
75. 2 U.S.C. § 441a(a)(2)(C) (2001).
76. 2 U.S.C. § 441a(7)(B)(i) (2001).
77. 2 U.S.C. § 441a(d) (2001).
78. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 58-59.
79. PRESS RELEASE, FEDERAL ELEcFION COMMISSION, FEC Reports Increase In Party Fun-
draising for 2000 (May 15. 2001), available at http://fecwebl.fec.gov/press/051501partyfund/
051501partyfund.html (last visited June 2, 2002).
80. Id.
81. Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002. supra note 58. at § 102.
82. Briffault, supra note 64. at 628.
83. Corrado, supra note 23, at 167.
84. Briffault. supra note 64, at 629.
2002]
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finance efforts that assisted both federal and state elections.8 5 The
FEC responded favorably to the party committees' request and, in
two advisory opinions in the late 1970s, created the notion of "soft
money."'86 In 1978, the FEC ruled a state party could use funds nor-
mally impermissible under the FECA to fund the non-federal portion
of their activities. 87 Included in these permissible activities were voter
mobilization and registration activities, which directly benefit both
federal and state candidates.88 Additionally, in 1979, the FEC "de-
cided that national party committees could also set up accounts for
deposit and disbursement of funds otherwise barred by the FECA to
finance support for the non-federal portion of the combined federal-
state ticket." 89
Based on the idea that some of their activities influenced state can-
didates, political parties and committees exploited the notion of soft
money to build strong party infrastructures in the 1980s.90 These
groups used soft money to defray the costs of the seemingly federal
and state operations of political parties, including the hiring of staff,
acquisition of office space, development of direct mail capability, run-
ning of polling, issues research operations, and others.91 More promi-
nently, "soft money" is currently used to fund issue advocacy,
grassroots organizations, and "get out the vote" activities. 92 There-
fore, the costs for certain political tools such as "pins, bumper stickers,
handbills, brochures, posters, party tabloids, and yard signs" 93 may all
be funded through soft money. 94
Since the 1980s, the use of soft money has exploded and now plays a
very substantial role in the overall financing of political campaigns. 95
Together, the two national parties raised $86 million dollars in soft
money for the 1992 federal elections, which was double the amount
raised in soft money from the 1988 federal elections.96 In the 2000
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. Op. FEC 1978-10 in 1975-1984 CAMPAIGN PRACTrICES GUIDE: FEDERAL ELEC LION COM-
MISSION ADVISORY OPINIONS 167 (1978).




92. 2 U.S.C. § 431(8)(B)(xii) (2001).
93. 2 U.S.C. § 431(8)(B)(x) (2001).
94. Id.
95. Corrado, supra note 23, at 167. See generally PETER LINDSTROM & ELLEN MILLER,
MONEY AND POLITICS: SOFT MONEY - A LOOPHOLE FOR THE 80's (1985) (discussing various
reports of soft money use in elections in the 1980's).
96. Briffault, supra note 64, at 630.
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federal election cycle, the FEC reported that $495.1 million was spent
in soft money,97 including $245.2 million spent by the Democratic
Party and $249.9 million spent by the Republican Party.98 The Bipar-
tisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002 bans all soft money.99
E. Party Expenditure Provision
In the aftermath of the Buckley decision, Congress repealed the
FECA sections ruled unconstitutional100 and enacted a new section
titled the Party Expenditure Provision (the Provision).101 While polit-
ical parties may only directly contribute $5000 per election to candi-
dates for federal office, the Provision allows parties to spend
additional funds on behalf of candidates for federal office.102 The im-
portance of the Provision is clear when one considers the fact that the
97. PRESS RELEASE, supra note 79.
98. Id.
99. 1d.
100. 18 U.S.C. § 608 (1970) (repealed 1976).
101. 2 U.S.C. § 441a(d) (2001).
(d) Expenditures by national committee, State committee, or subordinate committee
of State committee in connection with general election campaign of candidates for
Federal Office.
(1) Notwithstanding any other provision of law with respect to limitations on ex-
penditures or limitations on contributions, the national committee of a political
party and a State committee of a political party. including any subordinate
committee of a State committee. may make expenditures in connection with
the general election campaign of candidate for Federal office, subject to the
limitations contained in paragraphs (2) and (3) of this subsection.
(2) The national committee of a political party may not make any expenditure in
connection with the general election campaign of any candidate for President
of the United States who is affiliated with such party which exceeds an amount
equal to 2 cents multiplied by the voting age population of the United States
(as certified under subsection (e) of this section). Any expenditure under this
paragraph shall be in addition to any expenditure by a national committee of a
political party serving as the principal campaign committee of a candidate for
the office of President of the United States.
(3) The national committee of a political party, or a State committee of a political
party, including any subordinate committee of a State committee, may not
make any expenditure in connection with the general election campaign of a
candidate for Federal office in a State who is affiliated with such party which
exceeds -
(A) in the case of a candidate for election of the office of Senator, or Repre-
sentative from a State which is entitled to only one Representative, the
greater of -
(i) 2 cents multiplied by the voting age population of the State (as certi-
fied under subsection (e) of this section): or
(ii) in the case of a candidate for election to the office of Representative.




FECA allows individuals and PACs to contribute significantly more to
political parties than to candidates. 10 3
The history of the Provision is a bit of an enigma. The "rapid revi-
sion of the FECA in the wake of the [Buckley] Court's far-reaching
decision" removed the unconstitutional section on expenditures, "but
overlooked that on expenditures by party committees and with it the
possibility that expenditure limits on parties were just as unconstitu-
tional as those on non-party political committees. ' 10 4 The FEC re-
solved this problem when it published regulations for the amended
FECA by interpreting the Provision as creating the unique category of
coordinated expenditures. 105 Freeman finds "the legislative basis for
coordinated expenditures is rather sparse, consisting solely of an ob-
scure reference in the Conference Report on the 1976 FECA.' °6 The
Conference Report stated the exception for political parties "allows
the political parties to make contributions in kind by spending money
for certain functions to aid the individual candidates who represent
the party during the election process. ' 10 7 If not for the exception, in-
dependent expenditures would be treated as contributions subject to
the FECA limitations.108
F. Colorado Republican Federal Campaign Committee v.
Federal Election Commission
The distinction between independent and coordinated expenditures
and which may be regulated under the FECA was the subject of litiga-
tion in Colorado Republican Federal Campaign Committee v. Federal
Election Commission. 10 9 At issue was a radio advertisement paid for
by the Colorado Republican Campaign Committee, challenged as a
violation of the FECA.110 The District Court of the District of Colo-
rado granted summary judgment for the Colorado Party and the
United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reversed, finding
in favor of the FEC.11 1 The Supreme Court granted certiorari to de-
103. See supra notes 69-81 and accompanying text. Individuals may only contribute $1,000 to
a candidate, but $20,000 to a political party. 2 U.S.C. § 441a(a)(1)(1-b) (2001).
104. Jo Freeman, Political Party Contributions and Expenditures Under the Federal Election
Campaign Act: Anomalies and Unfinished Business, 4 PACE L. REV. 267, 275 (1984).
105. Id. at 276.
106. Id.
107. H.R. REP. No. 94-1057, at 59 (1976).
108. Id.
109. 518 U.S. 604 (1996).
110. Id. at 608.
111. Id. at 613.
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termine if the expenditure was independent and if so, whether it could
be constitutionally regulated. 112
1. Background
In 1996, opponents of campaign regulation received a substantial
victory from the Supreme Court's decision in Colorado Republican
Federal Campaign Committee v. Federal Election Commission (Colo-
rado 1).113 The petitioners in the case, the Colorado Republican Fed-
eral Campaign Committee (Colorado Party), bought radio
advertisements 1 4 attacking the Democratic Party's likely senatorial
candidate, Timothy Wirth, before they had selected a senatorial candi-
date.' 15 After the State Democratic Party complained to the FEC, the
FEC brought suit against the petitioners for violations of the FECA,
charging that the expenditure exceeded the dollar limits of the
FECA's limitation on campaign expenditures.' 1 6 The State Demo-
cratic Party pointed out that the Colorado Party had already assigned
all of its $103,248 general election coordinated expenditure allotment
to the National Republican Senatorial Committee. 117 The FEC
brought a complaint against the Colorado Party for a violation of the
Party Expenditure Provision. 1 8 The Colorado Party filed a counter-
claim that the Party Expenditure Provision violated the First
Amendment."19
112. Id.
113. Id. at 604.
114. Id. at 608. The text of the advertisements read as follows:
Paid for by the Colorado Republican State Central Committee.
Here in Colorado we're used to politicians who let you know where they stand, and I
thought we could count on Tim Wirth to do the same. But the last few weeks have
been a real eye-opener. I just saw some ads where Tim Wirth said he's for a strong
defense and balanced budget. But according to his record, Tim Wirth voted against
every new weapon system in the last five years. And he voted against the balanced
budget amendment.
Tim Wirth has a right to run for the Senate, but he doesn't have a right to change the
facts.
Colorado 1, 518 U.S. at 608.
115. Fed. Election Comm'n v. Colo. Republican Fed. Campaign Comm., 839 F. Supp. 1448,
1451 (D. Colo. 1993), rev'd. 59 F. 3d 1015 (10th Cir. 1995), vacated, 518 U.S. 604 (1996).
Colorado 1, 518 U.S. at 608.
116. Colorado 1. 518 U.S. at 608.
117. Id. at 612.
118. Id.
119. Id. The Colorado Party also challenged the statute's applicability, because the radio ad-
vertisements were not made in connection with a specific candidate. See David J. Lekich, Note.,
Still Blinking at Political Reality in Federal Elections. Colorado Republican Federal Campaign
Committee v. Federal Election Commission. 75 N.C. L. REV. 1848. 1855-56 (1997).
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a. District Court for the District of Colorado
The District Court for the District of Colorado granted summary
judgment for the Colorado Party.120 It dismissed the counterclaims as
moot, holding that the Party Expenditure Provision only regulated ex-
penditures made in connection with an election campaign using "ex-
press words of advocacy or defeat," a standard which was not
implicated in the Colorado Party expenditure. 121 Both sides appealed
the ruling. 122
b. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit
Before the Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit, the FEC argued
for a broader interpretation of the provision, which would encompass
all "advertisements containing an 'electioneering message' about a
'clearly identified candidate.'" 2 3 The Colorado Party raised its coun-
terclaim once again. 124 The Tenth Circuit agreed with the FEC and
held the Party Expenditure Provision to be both applicable and con-
stitutional. 125 The Supreme Court granted certiorari to review the de-
cisions and consider both parties' arguments. 126
2. Supreme Court Decision
The Supreme Court, in a 7-2 decision, reaffirmed the Buckley dis-
tinction between contributions and expenditures and held that (1) the
Colorado Party's expenditure constituted an independent expendi-
ture, 127 and (2) the portion of the Party Expenditure Provision regu-
lating such expenditures was unconstitutional. 28 The Court dismissed
the FEC's argument that all expenditures by a political party should
be treated as per se coordinated.1 29 The Court also dismissed the
120. 839 F. Supp. 1448, 1457 (D. Colo. 1993), rev'd, 59 F.3d 1015 (10th Cir. 1995).
121. Id.
122. Fed. Election Comm'n v. Colo. Republican Fed. Campaign Comm., 59 F.3d 1015 (10th
Cir. 1995), vacated, 518 U.S. 604 (1996).
123. Fed. Election Comm'n, 59 F.3d at 1022.
124. Id. at 1018.
125. Id. at 1023. The Tenth Circuit reasoned that because political party expenditures could
have corruptive effects on federal elections, the government's interest in limiting those expendi-
tures was sufficiently compelling to justify some First Amendment infringement. See Lekich,
supra note 119, at 1857-58.
126. 518 U.S. 604 (1996).
127. Colorado 1, 518 U.S. at 614. The radio advertisement was characterized as independent.
because the advertisements were solely developed and approved by the Party Chairman, read
only by the executive and political directors of the Party, and discussed at meetings attended
only by party staff. See Lekich, supra note 119, at 1858.
128. Colorado 1, 518 U.S. at 618.
129. Id. at 614.
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FEC's purported compelling governmental interest in preventing cor-
ruption or the appearance of corruption by stating the true purpose of
the Party Expenditure Provision was "for the constitutionally insuffi-
cient purpose of reducing what it saw as wasteful and excessive cam-
paign spending."'130 Therefore, the Court reversed the ruling of the
Tenth Circuit and remanded the case to determine if the expenditure
at hand was truly independent or coordinated.131 In doing so, the
Court left the issue open as to whether a coordinated expenditure
could be constitutionally regulated by the FECA.132
Justice Clarence Thomas dissented from the opinion and advocated
the rejection of the Buckley framework for analyzing the constitution-
ality of campaign finance regulations, stating the Party Expenditure
Provision's limitations on coordinated and independent expenditures
failed strict scrutiny and therefore, were both an unconstitutional vio-
lation of the First Amendment. 133
III. SUBJECT OPINION: FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION V.
COLORADO REPUBLICAN CAMPAIGN COMMITTEE
13 4
Predictably, the constitutionality of regulations on coordinated ex-
penditures became the issue before the courts in Federal Election
Commission v. Colorado Republican Campaign Committee. 135 In a 5-
4 decision, the United States Supreme Court ruled the regulation of
coordinated expenditures did not violate the First Amendment. 136
A. United States District Court for the District of Colorado
On remand from the Supreme Court, the District Court for the Dis-
trict of Colorado granted summary judgment for the Colorado Party,
ruling that the FEC failed to offer "relevant, admissible evidence,
which suggests that coordinated party expenditures must be limited to
prevent corruption or the appearance thereof.' 1 37 The FEC made two
arguments to support their claim that regulation of coordinated ex-
penditures served a compelling governmental interest in the preven-
130. Id. at 618.
131. Id. at 625-26.
132. Id. Justices Kennedy and Thomas criticized the plurality for not addressing whether the
party expenditure provision was unconstitutional on its face. Id. at 626.
133. Colorado 1. 518 U.S. at 631.
134. 121 S. Ct. 2351 (2001).
135. Id.
136. See infra notes 165-193 and accompanying text.
137. Fed. Election Comm'n v. Colo. Republican Fed. Campaign Comm.. 41 F. Supp. 2d 1197,
1213 (D. Colo. 1999). affd, 213 F.3d 1221 (10th Cir. 2000). rev'd, 121 S. Ct. 2351 (2001).
2002]
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tion of corruption. 138 First, the FEC suggested "contributors to party
committees-individuals and PACs-are so powerful they could force
the party committee to compel a candidate to take a particular posi-
tion."'1 39 While unable to offer specific evidence of any quid pro quo
corruption where a member of Congress took an official action in ex-
change for any contribution to a political party,140 the FEC offered
substantial evidence of greater levels of access granted to members of
Congress and also of the impact of soft money. 141 The district court
ruled, however, that the FEC failed to meet its evidentiary burden and
dismissed the FEC's assertion that the coordinated expenditure provi-
sion was necessary to prevent a quid pro quo exchange of favors. 142
Second, the FEC asserted that "parties themselves have agendas
which' they wish to pursue and will support only those candidates who
agree to follow that agenda. ' 143 The district court stated the nature of
the modern political party is to "promote political ideas and policy
objectives," and a party is free to refuse to "fund a candidate who
engages in ... undesirable campaign tactics" as an exercise of its First
Amendment rights.144
Finally, the FEC asserted that the limits on coordinated expendi-
tures prevented the appearance of corruption. 45 The FEC stated that
because the public could not distinguish between "hard" and "soft"
money, limiting coordinated expenditures would serve to prevent the
"general public dissatisfaction with parties and politicians and the
amount of money in the political process. ' 146 In response, the district
court stated that the proper remedy to this problem was the education
of the public, rather than the limitation of coordinated expendi-
tures.147 Unable to find the Party Expenditure Provision's regulation
of coordinated expenditures served a compelling governmental inter-
est in preventing corruption, the district court granted summary judg-
ment for the Colorado Party and ruled the Party Expenditure
Provision unconstitutional.1 48




142. Id. at 1212.
143. Id. at 1211.
144. Fed. Election Comm'n, 41 F. Supp. 2d at 1212.
145. Id. at 1212-13.
146. Id. at 1213.
147. Id.
148. Id. at 1214.
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B. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit
The FEC appealed the district court's ruling to the Court of Ap-
peals for the Tenth Circuit. 149 The FEC asserted three arguments in
support of its proposition that the coordinated expenditure provision
prevents corruption or the appearance of corruption. 50
1. Corruption Through Influence Over the Party
First, the FEC maintained its previous assertion that contributors to
a political party could corrupt the political process through their influ-
ence over a party.1 51 The FEC offered an affidavit from former Sena-
tor Paul Simon, who referenced a meeting of the Democratic Caucus
where members discussed a particular amendment. 52 Simon ob-
served that the amendment clearly benefited one particular corpora-
tion that had contributed $1.4 million to incumbent members in the
last election cycle.1 53 In response to Simon's objection to the amend-
ment, one senior colleague stated: "I'm tired of Paul always talking
about special interests; we've got to pay attention to who is buttering
our bread."'1 54 However, the Tenth Circuit stated that corporate influ-
ence was already regulated by the FECA15 5 and if those limits were
inadequate, it was the role of Congress, not the courts, to address the
issue. 156
2. Pursuit of Personal Interests
Second, the FEC asserted that "unscrupulous party officials can
utilize the party's coordinated spending authority to further their per-
sonal interests or those of an unrepresentative party faction."' 57 In
support, the FEC offered evidence that coordinated expenditures
were controlled by a small group of incumbent officeholders who had
used the power to support candidates from their home states.1 58 The
Tenth Circuit disagreed, stating political parties, rather than foster
corruption, actually provided a check on corruption through their
ability to "generate countervailing collective power on behalf of the
149. Fed. Election Comm'n v. Colo. Republican Fed. Campaign Comm., 213 F.3d. 1221 (10th
Cir. 2000). rev'd, 121 S. Ct. 2351 (2001).
150. Fed. Election Conimn. 213 F.3d at 1228.




155. 2 U.S.C. § 441b(a) (2001).
156. Fed. Election Comm'n. 213 F.3d. at 1229.




many individually powerless against the relatively few who are indi-
vidually-or organizationally-powerful."' 159
3. Circumvention of Contribution Limits
Finally, the FEC contended that the Party Expenditure Provision
was necessary to prevent the circumvention of contribution limita-
tions.160 The FEC raised the possibility of an individual circumventing
the $1000 direct contribution limitation by "contributing $20,000 to a
political party with the expectation that this money would be used to
support a particular candidate.' 1 61 While the Tenth Circuit agreed
such an act would constitute corruption, the court stated that Con-
gress had precluded this possibility by designating that any contribu-
tions specifically "earmarked" for a particular candidate would be
treated as a contribution to that candidate and therefore subject to
regulation. 162 Further, the court reasoned that vigilant enforcement
of the contribution limitations was the more appropriate response,
rather than abridging constitutionally protected speech through the
coordinated expenditure limitation. 163 Therefore, finding that the
Party Expenditure Provision was not closely tailored to the prevention
of corruption or its appearance, the Tenth Circuit ruled that the Party
Expenditure Provision constituted a significant interference with First
Amendment protected speech and affirmed the district court's
ruling.164
C. Supreme Court Decision165
The Supreme Court granted certiorari to determine whether the
regulation of coordinated expenditures violated the First Amendment.
Relying on the history of the FECA, various testimony, and the explo-
ration of the true role of political parties, the Court ruled coordinated
expenditures could be regulated. Justice Thomas dissented from the
majority, arguing coordinated expenditures could not be regulated
under the First Amendment.
159. Id. at 1231 (quoting WALTER DEAN DURNHAM, CRITICAL ELECTIONS AND THE MAIN-
SPRINGS OF AMERICAN POLITICS 133 (1970)).
160. Fed. Election Comm'n, 213 F.3d at 1231.
161. Id.
162. Id. at 1232.
163. Id.
164. Id. at 1232-33.
165. Fed. Election Comm'n v. Colo. Republican Fed. Campaign Comm., 121 S. Ct. 2351
(2001).
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1. Majority Opinion
The Supreme Court granted certiorari to address the remaining is-
sue left unresolved by Colorado L 166 In a 5-4 majority opinion, Justice
David H. Souter announced the following issues that needed to be
resolved: "[D]oes limiting coordinated spending impose a unique bur-
den on parties, and is there reason to think that coordinated spending
by a party would raise the risk of corruption posed when others spend
in coordination with a candidate?"' 67 The Colorado Party argued that
because of the intimate relationship between a party and a candidate,
a party "cannot function ... without coordinated spending, the object
of which is a candidate's election."' 68 According to the Colorado
Party, the sole point of organizing a party was to elect a successful
candidate who shares the party's goals, thus differentiating a party
from individuals, PACs, and corporations, all of which are subject to
more stringent regulations.1 69 Therefore, the Colorado Party believed
the Party Expenditure Provision should be subject to the highest level
of scrutiny and declared unconstitutional. 170 The Court rejected this
argument through an examination of the history of the FECA, reli-
ance upon statements from political scientists regarding the effect of
coordinated expenditure limitations upon parties, and an analysis of
the broad role played by political parties in elections.1 7'
a. History of the FECA and Political Scientist's Testimony
First, the Court found the Colorado Party's statement to be at odds
with the history of the FECA for over nearly thirty years. 172 Pointing
out coordinated expenditures by parties had been regulated since the
1974 amendments, the Court relied upon testimony of political scien-
tists who stated,
"[T]here is little evidence to suggest that coordinated party spend-
ing limits adopted by Congress have frustrated the ability of politi-
cal parties to exercise their First Amendment rights to support their
candidates," and that "[in reality, political parties are dominant
players, second only to the candidates themselves, in federal
elections."' 73
166. Id. at 2358.
167. Id. at 2360.
168. Id. at 2362. See also Brief for Respondent at 25-31. Fed. Election Comm'n v. Colo. Re-
publican Fed. Campaign Comm., 121 S. Ct. 2351 (2001) (No. 00-191).
169. Colorado I, 121 S. Ct. at 2361.
170. Id. See also Brief for Respondent. supra note 168, at 31.
171. Colorado II, 121 S. Ct. at 2362. 2365.




b. Role of Political Parties
In analyzing the role of political parties, the Court found it insuffi-
cient to characterize their chief role as electing particular candi-
dates.1 74 The Court suggested that the money parties spend comes
from a wide variety of sources, including individuals and PACs, each
with its own narrow interests. 175 Because it is common for PACs to
contribute to both parties during the same election cycle and even to
opposing candidates in the same election, the Court characterized par-
ties as:
instruments of some contributors whose object is not to support the
party's message or to elect party candidates across the board, but
rather to support a specific candidate for the sake of a position on
one, narrow issue, or even to support any candidate who will be
obliged to the contributors.1 76
The Court identified this party role, which puts the party in position to
be used to circumvent contribution limits, 177 as exactly what the Party
Expenditure Provision sought to regulate. 178 Additionally, the Court
equated the influential ability of parties with that of individuals by
asserting that many individuals can rival the spending of a political
party because "[r]ich political activists crop up, and the United States
has known its Citizens Kane.' 79 Under this reasoning, individuals are
subject to coordinated spending limitations, just as parties should
be.18 0
The Court applied heightened scrutiny and found the prevention of
circumvention of contribution limits was a sufficiently important gov-
ernmental interest because circumvention constituted an appearance
of corruption or actual corruption. 81 The Court relied upon evidence
174. Id.
175. Id. Additionally, the FEC argued that political parties did not deserve any favored con-
stitutional status that would exempt them from the spending limits that apply to other donors.
Brief for Petitioner at 14, Fed. Election Comm'n v. Colo. Republican Fed. Campaign Comm.,
121 S. Ct. 2351 (2001) (No. 00-191). The FEC also argued that the Framers of the Constitution
did not trust political parties and never intended to create any special privileges or incentives for
political parties. Id. at 15.
176. Colorado H, 121 S. Ct. at 2364.
177. Id. at 2365. "A candidate assisted by party-coordinated expenditures may, once elected
or re-elected, be induced to take actions favorable to the individuals or [PAC] who have contrib-
uted funds to the party, thereby in effect using the party as a conduit to evade the FEC limits on
contributions to candidates." Brief for Petitioner, supra note 175, at 14.
178. Colorado 11, 121 S. Ct. at 2364.
179. Id. at 2365.
180. Id.
181. Id. at 2366.
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of the Democratic Party's adoption of a tallying system, 18 2 which is a
"system that helps to connect donors to candidates through the ac-
commodation of a party.' 8 3 Former Senator Paul Simon was also
cited as describing the tallying system as "an informal agreement be-
tween the DSCC [Democratic Senatorial Campaign Committee] and
the candidates' campaign that if you help the DSCC raise contribu-
tions, we will turn around and help your campaign."' 8 4 Therefore, the
tallying system would allow donors to more or less contribute to a
specific senatorial campaign by donating money to a party, which
would later be contributed to a candidate's campaign through coordi-
nated expenditures. 185 The Court further evinced the threat of cir-
cumvention through the consideration of a fundraising letter offered
from Congressman Wayne Allard, "explaining to the contributor that
'you are at the limit of what you can directly contribute to my cam-
paign,' but 'you can further help my campaign by assisting the Colo-
rado Republican Party."' 86
Finding a clear threat, if not practice, of circumvention, the Court
rejected the Colorado Party's claim that the Party Expenditure Provi-
sion was not closely tailored to preventing circumvention. 18 7 The Col-
orado Party first argued that better enforcement of the earmarking
rule,1 88 rather than limitations on coordinated expenditures, consti-
182. Kathleen Dolegowski, Restrictions on Campaign Expenditures Do Not Violate First
Amendment Rights, 16 LAW. J. 3 (August 10, 2001). Dolegowski's description of the tallying
system is helpful:
This device appears to work in two related ways. Donors contribute to a political party
with the understanding, tacit or otherwise, that their contributions, while not direct, are
fairly close. The political party then assures the donors that their contributions will be
credited to the candidates of their choice. An informal relationship also exists between
the individual candidates' campaign committees and political party campaign commit-
tees such that contributions by the individual candidates' campaign committees to a
political party campaign committee will result in increased spending by the latter on
behalf of the former in proportion to the amouni contributed to the latter by the
former.
Id. at 17.
183. Colorado II, 121 S. Ct. at 2368.
t84. Id.
185. Id. But see Brief for Respondent. supra note 168, at 39-43. The FEC approved of the
tallying system on the condition that earmarking could be disclaimed. Id. at 39. "Senator Simon
explained that the tally system 'made clear that this is not just automatic, so that no one could
say if Tom Smith contributed $5.000 to the DSCC. that was a way of laundering it coming to Paul
Simon.'" Id. at 40 (internal citations omitted). "Similarly. an aide to Senator Fowler explained
that 'we were not able to tell these contributors that the money could come back directly to help
us:" but rather that it may indirectly help the Senator. Id.
186. Colorado II. 121 S. Ct. at 2368.
187. Id.
188. Id. at 2369.
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tuted a more appropriate means of addressing corruption. 1 9 The
Court rejected this argument, however, stating the earmarking rule
failed to expose such informal agreements made between parties and
candidates. 190 Reliance upon the earmarking rule alone would fail to
address these so called "'understandings' regarding which donors give
what amounts to the party, which candidates are to receive what funds
from the party, and what interests particular donors are seeking to
promote."'191 The Court additionally rejected the Colorado Party's ar-
gument that replacing limits on coordinated expenditures by parties
with limits on contributions to parties would resolve the problem of
corruption.' 92 Because the Court found the Party Expenditure Provi-
sion to be closely drawn to serve a sufficiently important governmen-
tal interest, the judgment of the Court of Appeals for the Tenth
Circuit was reversed. 193
2. Justice Thomas's Dissent
Justice Thomas issued a dissent with Justice Antonin Scalia and Jus-
tice Anthony M. Kennedy joining in full and Chief Justice William H.
Rehnquist joining in part. 194 Justice Thomas1 95 stated that the Court
erred in determining coordinated expenditures were the same as con-
tributions and political parties were the same as individuals and politi-
cal committees.' 96
a. Coordinated Expenditures
Justice Thomas conceded that coordinated expenditures may some-
times resemble a contribution, offering for example an instance of "a
donation of money with direct payment of a candidate's media
bills.' 1 97 However, he also offered an instance where a coordinated
expenditure would be closer to an independent contribution, as in the
case where a party developed a television advertisement and merely
consulted with a certain candidate on which time slot should be used
to maximize exposure.1 98
189. Id.
190. Id. at 2370.
191. Id.
192. Colorado 11, 121 S. Ct. at 2370.
193. Id. at 2371.
194. Id. at 2371 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
195. Id. Justice Thomas would have overturned Buckley, as he believed that the FECA regu-
lates political speech, and that no governmental regulation on political contributions or expendi-
tures could satisfy strict scrutiny. Id.
196. Id. at 2372.
197. Colorado 11, 121 S. Ct. at 2372 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
198. Id. at 2373.
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b. Role of Political Parties
Second, Justice Thomas distinguished the role of the political party
from that of an individual or a PAC.199 Justice Thomas argued, while
contribution restrictions on individuals or PACs constitute only a mar-
ginal restriction on their First Amendment rights, coordinated expen-
diture limits on a party have precluded them "'from effectively
amplifying the voice of their adherents,' and has had a 'stifling effect
on the ability of the party to do what it exists to do.' "2(1 Because "[a]
party nominates its candidate; a candidate often is identified by party
affiliation throughout the election and on the ballot; and a party's
public image is largely defined by what its candidates say and do," the
two are inseparable. 20 Justice Thomas stated that a party and candi-
date have a unity of interest in getting the candidate elected and
found it impractical, imprudent, and inefficient "for a party to support
its own candidates without some form of 'cooperation' or 'consulta-
tion."' 202 In essence, Justice Thomas argued it was natural for a party
and candidate to work together, and "breaking the connection be-
tween parties and candidates inhibits the promotion of the party's
message. 2 °13
Justice Thomas also relied on a statement by the FEC that party
organizations "had to establish legally separate entities, which in turn
had to 'rent and furnish an office, hire a staff, and pay other adminis-
trative costs,' as well as 'engage in additional consulting services' and
'duplicate many of the functions already being undertaken by other
party offices,"' in order to ensure expenditures were independent.20 4
Further, Justice Thomas criticized the majority's reliance on amicus
curiae briefs by political scientists rather than the factual and eviden-
tiary record established in the district court. 20 5
199. Id.
200. Id. at 2374.
201. Id. at 2373.
202. Id.
203. Colorado I1. 121 S. Ct. at 2376 (Thomas. J.. dissenting). See also Brief for Respondent.
supra note 168. at 25-31. "[P]arty candidates exist because parties nominate them, and from the
moment a party makes a nomination a natural, strong, and unique tie is established." Id. at 26.
The candidate relationship is of vital importance to the historical purpose of parties: parties exist
to elect candidates that share their views. Id.




c. The Party Expenditure Provision Is Not Closely Drawn to
Prevent Corruption
While Justice Thomas found that preventing corruption or the ap-
pearance of corruption was a constitutionally sufficient justification,
he argued the FEC had failed to the meet its evidentiary burden of
proving that the Party Expenditure Provision was closely drawn to
meet the justification. 20 6 In Justice Thomas's view, the FEC failed to
provide any congressional findings suggesting the Party Expenditure
Provision was necessary or even helpful in reducing or preventing
corruption. 207
Justice Thomas criticized the Court's suggestion that the Party Ex-
penditure Provision prevented circumvention of contribution limits.20 8
He rejected the .Court's characterization of the tallying system as evi-
dence of circumvention of contribution limits. 209 Justice Thomas de-
scribed the tallying system as legal and stated the DSCC "has
allocated money based on a number of factors, including 'the financial
strength of the campaign,' 'what [the candidate's] poll numbers
looked like,' and 'who had the best chance of winning or who needed
the money most.' "210 Further, relying on the district court's findings,
he maintained "the primary consideration in allocating funds is which
races are marginal" because "maintaining party control over seats is
paramount to the parties' pursuits."1211
Finally, Justice Thomas found the Party Expenditure Provision not
closely drawn to the prevention or appearance of corruption. 212 He
adopted the Colorado Party's argument that stronger enforcement of
the earmarking rule served as the precise answer to prevent corrup-
tion.21 3 Justice Thomas criticized the Court for not putting forth any
evidence of why enforcing the earmarking rule would be an improper
response to preventing corruption. Second, Justice Thomas suggested
lowering the individual contribution cap of twenty thousand dollars as
a means of preventing corruption. 214 Through this method, the speech
206. Id. at 2376.
207. Id. at 2377. "Despite five and one-half years of discovery, the FEC failed to identify a
single instance in which a modern political party has corrupted a member of Congress." Brief for
Respondent, supra note 168. at 33 (emphasis in original). The Party Expenditure Provision was
enacted to reduce overall campaign spending, not to eliminate any perceived corruption. Id. at
36.
208. Colorado II. 121 S. Ct. at 2379 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
209. Id. at 2378.
210. Id.
211. Id.
212. Id. at 2379-80.
213. Id. at 2380.
214. Colorado HI. 121 S. Ct. at 2380 (Thomas. J., dissenting).
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restriction would be "directed at the source of the alleged corrup-
tion-the individual donor-and not the party. '215 Explaining that
the normal method of deterring unlawful conduct was to punish the
wrongdoer, he stated "[i]t would be quite remarkable to hold that
speech by a law-abiding [entity] can be suppressed in order to deter
conduct by a non-law-abiding third party."216
IV. ANALYSIS
A sigh of collective relief from campaign finance reformers was
most certainly heard across Capitol Hill after the United States Su-
preme Court's decision in Colorado II upheld the twenty-five year old
FECA "hard money" limitations on political parties. As one com-
mentator stated shortly after the Court's ruling, "[t]his comes at a crit-
ical time, as some lower courts have been striking down federal and
state campaign finance laws, believing such laws cannot withstand
constitutional attack.1217 The Court correctly recognized that political
parties can act to circumvent contribution levels through the use of
coordinated expenditures. 218 The Court also realized political parties
are not so closely tied to candidates. 21 9 In equating the role played by
political parties with that of other self-interested actors, the Court
properly understood the inherent vulnerability of political parties. 220
Most importantly, by giving voice to the realities of our political sys-
tem, the Court took a small, initial step toward understanding the fun-
damental problem with First Amendment campaign finance
regulation jurisprudence. What the Court and previous Courts have
failed to recognize is the faulty assumption that underlies not only
Colorado I but also Buckley, which is the assertion that the contribu-
tion and expenditure of money is speech, rather than conduct. 221 Fi-
nally, because of Buckley's faulty assumption, many have called for its
215. Id.
The FEC's theories of actual, potential, and perceived corruption overwhelmingly start
with a concern over large contributions to a political party. If such concerns are sub-
stantial, a closely drawn response would be to reduce the allowable size of contribu-
tions .... To address supposed corruption concerns by restricting a political party's use
of hard money to fund coordinated speech is fairly described as irrational and perverse.
Brief for Respondent, supra note 168, at 46-47.
216. Colorado II, 121 S. Ct. at 2380 (Thomas, J.. dissenting).
217. Edward Zuckerman, Colorado 11: Did the High Court Create Political Equality Trap for
McCain-Feingold?, POL. FIN. & LOBBY REP. 1 (June 27, 2001). Lawrence Noble, who pursued
the case throughout his tenure as the Federal Election Commission's general counsel, issued the
statement. Id.
218. See supra notes 166-173 and accompanying text.
219. Colorado II. 121 S. Ct. at 2380 (Thomas. J.. dissenting).
220. Id.
221. Supra note 43.
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reversal through the identification of new compelling interests other
than corruption, which would withstand strict scrutiny.
A. Political Parties Act to Circumvent Contribution Limits
Through Coordinated Spending
While unable to tie such an assertion to actual instances of corrup-
tion, the Court properly relied on various testimonies from political
actors to infer the practice of circumvention is not the exception, but
rather dominates the political arena. 222 In addition to Former Senator
Paul Simon's affidavit regarding the practice of tallying223 and a fun-
draising letter from Congressman Wayne Allard,224 a plethora of evi-
dence established the reality of this point.225 While Justice Thomas
was correct when he described the tallying system as a legal prac-
tice, 226 he failed to realize the implications of such a practice. The
fundamental problem is that the tallying process creates a public per-
ception of corruption and further disenchants the public with the po-
litical process. Current statistics show the lack of public confidence in
our federal government has reached an all time high.227
A public opinion poll taken in 1964 found that 76% of the Ameri-
can people trusted their government to do what is right most or all
of the time. Thirty years later, in 1994, the same poll reported only
21 % of the public having the same level of faith in Washington's
decisions. 228
Additionally, a poll taken in 1995 revealed nearly half of those ques-
tioned believed special interest groups controlled the federal govern-
ment. 229  Such glaring statistics expose the political reality that
Colorado II recognized.
B. Individuals Use Political Parties to Circumvent
Individual Contribution Limits
The tallying system is not the only practice that creates the appear-
ance and actuality of corruption. Private donors often use political
222. See supra notes 172-193 and accompanying text.
223. Colorado L1 121 S. Ct. at 2368.
224. Id.
225. LINDSTROM, supra note 95. at 16 (stating that "[o]ne guest at the Democratic Convention
was told not to worry about the Federal limit, instead, he should just decide what he wanted to
give and someone would tell him how to make out the check.").
226. Colorado 11, 121 S. Ct. at 2378.
227. David L. Boren, A Recipe for the Reform of Congress. 21 OKLA. CITY U. L. REV. 1
(1996). reprinted in THE CONSTITUTION AN1) CAMPAIGN FINANCE REFORM: AN ANTHOLOGY 5
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parties to evade the individual limits on donors established by the
FECA. While small donors may have little influence over how the
parties use their donations, "a substantial portion of hard money do-
nations to the parties consists of very large gifts," 230 which increases
their individual access to elected officials.2 3' "In 1996, 86% of the
hard money in excess of $200 given by individuals to the national
Democratic Party consisted of gifts of $1000 or more; 46% came in
donations of $10,000 or more. ' 232 Additionally, in the national Re-
publican Party, 52% of the hard money in excess of $200 consisted of
gifts of $1000 or more, and 15% of the hard money consisted of
$10,000 or more.233 These types of large donations to political parties
establish close links between officeholders and potential donors to the
parties, often resulting in greater access to officeholders. 234 With clear
evidence that donors use political parties to circumvent individual
contribution limitations, the Court properly realized that a prohibition
on coordinated expenditure limits would only increase such activity
and further undermine the public's confidence in the government.
C. Political Parties Play the Same Role as Other
Self-Interested Actors
The Colorado II majority rejected the Colorado Party's and Justice
Thomas's assertion that political parties and candidates are joined by
a "unity of interest. ' 235 In doing so, the Court properly declared that
political parties should be treated similar to PACs and other self-inter-
ested actors for the purpose of the FECA.236 There is strong evidence
that political parties do not share a complete unity of interest with
candidates, and this can be found in the common practice of PACs
230. Briffault. supra note 64. at 649.
23t. Colorado II. 121 S. Ct. at 2368.
232. Briffault, supra note 64. at 649.
233. Id.
234. Id. at 650. In connection with the 1996 elections, "[democrats offered their $ 50.000+
donors intimate dinners with the President, small-group coffees in the White House Map Room.
and overnight stays in the Lincoln Bedroom. Republicans provided members of their Team 100
- those who gave $100,000 or more - with a three-day opportunity to golf with Senate Majority
Leader Lott. Speaker Gingrich, and then-House Appropriations Committee Chair (and briefly
Speaker-designate) Livingston at The Breakers at Palm Beach.- Id. Additionally. in 1995-96.
"'[d]inners. weekend outings. and other events were regularly used by both major parties to give
major donors a sense that they are close to power.' Id.
235. Colorado L1 121 S. Ct. at 2368.
236. See supra notes 174-180 and accompanying text. For an argument that a unity of interest
exists between parties and candidates, see Stephen Ansolabehere & James M. Snyder. Jr. Sym-
posium: Law and Political Parties: Soft Money, Hard Money, Strong Parties. 100 COLUM. L. Rev.
598. 603 (2000) (arguing that party committees are primarily established to win a majority of
seats in the legislature or control of the executive office).
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contributing to both of the major parties. 237  While ideologically
driven, PACs are likely to pursue the election of "like-minded candi-
dates and are therefore more likely to support candidates of a single
party and even candidates challenging incumbents, '238 pragmatic
PACs do the opposite. 239 Pragmatic PACs:
have a diverse set of interests . .. [t]heir contributors come from
various locales and occupations, united only by the PAC's issue or
cause and the art of direct mail solicitation. They are the PAC ana-
logue to communities of single-issue voters in the electorate. They
are free to be ideologically pure, and (because they do not often
lobby) to take the political risks of ignoring party lines, of spurning
incumbents and supporting challengers.240
D. A Faulty Assumption: Money - Speech
The major criticism of the Supreme Court's campaign finance re-
form jurisprudence is that Buckley and subsequent decisions have
treated political money as speech, rather than conduct. 24' The charac-
terization of money as speech allows the Court to subject any govern-
mental regulation of political expenditures to strict scrutiny, thus
requiring such a regulation to serve a compelling governmental inter-
est and be narrowly tailored to serve that end. However, critics of this
distinction argue money is not speech, but conduct, therefore requir-
ing only that the regulation serve an important governmental interest
and be sufficiently drawn to serve that end.242
Indeed, in reviewing Buckley, the Court of Appeals for the District
of Columbia analogized the FECA limitations on contributions and
expenditures to the symbolic conduct exhibited in the burning of a
draft card in United States v. O'Brien.243 In doing so, the D.C. Circuit
used intermediate scrutiny and upheld the expenditure and contribu-
tion limitations as serving a "sufficiently important governmental in-
terest in regulating the nonspeech element" that was "unrelated to the
suppression of free expression" and that had an "incidental restriction
237. See supra notes 174-180 and accompanying text.
238. Corrado. supra note 23, at 125.
239. Id.
240. Id. at 126.
241. BUCKLEY SToPs HERE: LOOSENING THE JUDICIAL STRANGLEHOLD ON CAMPAIGN Fi-
NANCE REFORM 31 (E. Joshua Rosenkranz ed.. 1998).
242. Id. at 32.
243. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 16; United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968). Other examples
of the O'Brien conduct/symbolic speech line of cases include such acts as: refusing to salute the
United States flag (W.V. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943)): displaying a flag
(Stromberg v. California. 283 U.S. 359 (1931)): and burning the United States flag (Texas v.
Johnson, 491 U.S. 397 (1989)).
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on alleged First Amendment freedoms ... no greater than [was] es-
sential to the furtherance of that interest. ' 244 The Supreme Court,
however, rejected the D.C. Circuit's O'Brien analysis and ruled that
money was speech rather than conduct.245
Shortly after the Buckley decision, Judge Skelly Wright 246 defended
the D.C. Circuit's treatment of the FECA as regulating conduct rather
than speech. 24 7 Judge Wright stated:
O'Brien used the burning of this draft card as a vehicle for expres-
sing his political convictions. So too the use of money in political
campaigns serves nothing more than a vehicle for political expres-
sion. It may not have the same overt physical quality that burning a
draft card or picketing at the statehouse has, but it remains a mere
vehicle. Restrictions on the use of money should be judged by the
test employed for vehicles-for speech-related conduct and not by
the tests developed for pure speech. 248
Under the O'Brien test, the FECA limitations would likely pass con-
stitutional muster. The O'Brien Court ruled when speech and non-
speech elements are combined in the same course of conduct, a
regulation of that conduct only has to satisfy intermediate scrutiny.2 49
The test set forth in O'Brien established:
a governmental regulation is sufficiently justified if it is within the
constitutional power of the Government; if it furthers an important
or substantial governmental interest; if the governmental interest is
unrelated to the suppression of free expression; and if the incidental
restriction on alleged First Amendment freedoms is no greater than
essential to the furtherance of that interest. 250
First, the Constitution establishes that Congress has the power to reg-
ulate elections of members of the Senate and the House of Represent-
atives. 251  Second, the Buckley Court and subsequent Court
decisions 252 have held that Congress could legitimately conclude that
the avoidance of corruption or the appearance of corruption "is also
244. O'Brien, 391 U.S. at 367-77.
245. Supra note 43. The Court stated that the expenditure of money could not be equated
with the destruction of a draft card. Id.
246. Judge Skelly Wright was a member of the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
that upheld the FECA limitations by treating them as conduct rather than speech. J. Skelly
Wright, Politics and the Constitution: Is Money Speech?, 85 YALE L.J. 1001 (1976), reprinted in
THE CONSTITUTION AND CAMPAIGN FINANCE REFORM: AN ANTHOLOGY 58 (Fredrick G.
Slabech ed., Carolina Academic Press 1998).
247. Id.
248. Id. at 59.
249. O'Brien, 391 U.S. at 376. Intermediate scrutiny only requires that the regulation be
closely related to an important governmental interest. Id.
250. Id.
251. U.S. CONSI. art. I. § 4, cl. 10.
252. See supra notes 32. 128 and accompanying text.
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critical . .. if confidence in the system of representative Government is
not to be eroded to a disastrous extent. '253 Therefore, preventing cor-
ruption or the appearance of corruption clearly furthers a compelling
governmental interest. Third, the FECA limitations are content-neu-
tral regulations because they do not discriminate against any certain
viewpoint. 254 The limitations apply to all entities, regardless of which
viewpoint the money is directed toward. 255 Because the limitations
are content-neutral, they must be closely drawn to the interest in
preventing corruption. 256 The Colorado II Court rejected the Colo-
rado Party's argument that the FECA limitations on coordinated
spending were not closely tailored to the government's interest in
preventing corruption or the appearance of corruption.25 7
However, the application of the O'Brien line of jurisprudence to
campaign finance regulation has not gone unchallenged. Several ar-
guments have been developed to dispute the applicability of O'Brien
to campaign finance regulation. First, one commentator has inter-
preted the third condition of the O'Brien test which requires the gov-
ernmental interest be unrelated to the suppression of free speech as
warranting judicial deference "only if 'the harm that the state is seek-
ing to avert is one that.. . would arise even if the defendant's conduct
had no communicative significance whatsoever.' "258 According to
this argument, the anti-corruption purpose advanced by Congress de-
pends on the perceived communicative significance of campaign giv-
ing.259 Plainly stated, if no perceived communicative impact resulted
from campaign giving, the anti-corruption argument would fail.260
While this argument is credible when applied to the action of corrup-
tion, it fails to satisfy the Buckley Court's adoption of the appearance
of corruption as a compelling governmental interest. 261 In the au-
253. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 27 (quoting United States Civil Serv. Comm'n v. Nat'l Ass'n of
Letter Carriers, 413 U.S. 548. 565 (1973)).
254. Id.
255. The Buckley Court rejected this assertion and stated that the FECA limitations, while
not aimed at specific ideas expressed by certain groups, were related to the suppression of com-
munication. Id. at 17.
256. O'Brien, 391 U.S. at 376.
257. Colorado 11, 121 S. Ct. at 2368.
258. Bradley A. Smith. Money Talks: Speech, Corruption, Equality, and Campaign Finance, 86
GEO. L.J. 45, 51 (1997) (citing John Hart Ely). See also Lillian R. BeVier, Money and Politics: A
Perspective on the First Amendment and Campaign Finance Reform. 73 CAL. L. REV. 1045, 1058
(1985).
259. Smith, supra note 258.
260. Id. See also MARTIN H. REDISH, MONEY TALKS: SPEECH, ECONOMIC POWER, AND THE
VALUES OF DEMOCRACY 115 (2001) (discussing why the postulates of campaign finance reform
are flawed).
261. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 26.
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thor's view, the appearance of corruption always constitutes a harm,
regardless of whether the money given to an official actually results in
increased favor. As the Buckley Court alluded, where there is an ap-
pearance of corruption, public confidence in the government is
eroded. 262
A second line of arguments against the O'Brien application to cam-
paign regulations purports that campaign regulations can never be
content-neutral and are always content-based. This line of argument
states that campaign regulations are not content-neutral because those
who favor campaign finance reform "do so because they believe the
present system of finance gives some individuals too much influence,
thus leading to disfavored electoral and legislative results. '263 It is
further argued that those who seek to reform campaign finance do so
because the activities that are a target of the regulation are closely
tied to political agendas that reformers oppose. 264 Finally, opponents
of the O'Brien application argue laws regulating political behavior can
never have a neutral impact. 265 While campaign finance regulations
may ultimately not be wholly content-neutral, they are certainly not
content-based. They do not explicitly restrict contributions and ex-
penditures because of their viewpoints. Instead campaign finance reg-
ulations restrict all contributions and coordinated expenditures
regardless of the issue they support.
E. A Redefined Compelling Governmental Interest to
Challenge Buckley
The Buckley holding brought with it many negative societal ramifi-
cations. Treating the acts of contributing and spending money to and
for a political campaign as pure speech, whose effectiveness increases
with the dollar amount, only further marginalizes the average citizen.
The Buckley decision tells the average voter, who does not participate
in the monetary aspects of a campaign, that by only voting, they are
not exercising the maximum level of speech possible. The major flaw
is that the Court is reinforcing the idea that those with money are
more important than those who "merely" vote or volunteer their time
on a campaign. In essence, one need look no further than the Buckley
line of jurisprudence as a major reason for the political apathy and
distrust 266 in the country.
262. Id at 27.
263. Id. at 54.
264. BeVier, supra note 258. at 1061.
265. Id. at 1061-62.
266. See supra notes 226-228 and accompanying text.
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The appellees in Buckley asserted that the government had a com-
pelling governmental interest in equalizing the ability of all persons to
influence elections. 267 The Court, however, rejected this argument. 268
Critics of Buckley have rephrased the equalization interest and have
argued that the government has a compelling interest in equalizing the
ability of all persons to participate, rather than influence an elec-
tion.269 Therefore, a more accurate description of this interest would
be that it seeks to "narrow the gap" between the levels of participa-
tion.270 How the Supreme Court would interpret this redefined inter-
est is difficult to predict; however, two justices have already tipped
their hands to reveal their favor of such an interest.271 It remains to
be seen if they can convince another three. While there are sound
policy arguments for a greater equalization of the political arena,272
267. See Rosenkranz, supra note 46 and accompanying text.
268. Id.
269. Rosenkranz, supra note 241, at 68-69.
270. Id.
271. Id. Justice Stevens and Ginsburg stated that they believe "the Government has an im-
portant interest in leveling the electoral playing field by constraining the cost of federal cam-
paigns." Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting) (quoting Colo. Republican Fed. Campaign Comm. v. Fed.
Election Comm'n, 518 U.S. 604, 649-50 (1996)). The dissenters went on to argue: "It is quite
wrong to assume the net effect of limits on contributions and expenditures - which tend to
protect equal access to the political arena ... will be adverse to the interest in informed debate
protected by the First Amendment." Id. Additionally, in Austin v. Mich. Chamber of Com-
merce. 494 U.S. 652 (1990), the Court "upheld restrictions on campaign spending by corporations
in order to shield the election campaign from distortions caused by disproportionate exercises of
wealth." Burt Neuborne, Soft Landings, in IF BUCKLEY FELL: A FIRST AMENDMENT
BLUEPRINT FOR REGULATING MONEY IN POLITICS (E. Joshua Rosenkranz ed., 1999).
Neuborne also states:
[Tihe Court's willingness to ban big money was justified by a desire to protect the
election campaign . . . from the distorting effects of great wealth, even though the
speech was otherwise clearly protected. If we already regulate institutionally bounded
speech in aid of the proper functioning of the institution, and if we already recognize
elections as bounded institutions, and if we have already upheld significant regulation
of campaign speech to prevent powerful speakers from distorting the campaign process,
why can't we make the narrow jump remaining? Why can't we acknowledge that Buck-
ley was wrong, and that generous content-neutral limits on campaign spending designed
to level the electoral playing field between the extremely rich and everyone else do not
violate the First Amendment?
Id. at 181-82.
272. Neuborne has even gone as far as analogizing this problem to the days when only white
men with property were allowed the franchise:
The history of American democracy is a halting journey toward political equality.
When Thomas Jefferson became the first presidential candidate to oust an incumbent,
only white men of property were deemed worthy of participation in the democratic
process. Impediments to political equality have been removed one by one until, as a
formal matter, all voters now wield equal political power. In reality, though, uncon-
trolled campaign spending reintroduces the massive inequality of the early nineteenth
century. Under a regime of uncontrolled campaign spending, the richest 2 percent of
the population exercises massively disproportionate political power. They decide which
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the legal ones are greatly constrained by the Court's current
jurisprudence.
V. IMPACT
Campaign finance reform remains a hotbed of controversy. The re-
cent legislation passed by the Congress challenges several areas of the
Supreme Court's jurisprudence in this field. Additionally, the contin-
ued viability of the Buckley decision is also likely to be challenged by
the recent reforms. Commentators have vigorously analyzed recent
Supreme Court decisions, searching for chinks in the armor of Buck-
ley and they have not been dissatisfied with what they are finding.
Several justices have alluded to the numerous problems with Buckley.
A. The Continued Viability of Buckley
Given the current composition of the Court, there is a possibility
Buckley may be overturned when the Court reviews the constitution-
ality of the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002. "Only Chief
Justice Rehnquist, who voted to uphold contribution caps but strike
spending caps, remains, along with Justice John Paul Stevens, who was
sitting on the Court but did not participate in the" Buckley decision. 273
Additionally, in Colorado I, three justices, without invitation from the
parties, rejected Buckley's distinction between contributions and ex-
penditures. 27 4 Justice Stevens, joined by Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg
declared their belief that contributions and expenditures could be reg-
ulated.275 On the other side of the issue was Justice Thomas, who be-
lieved contributions and expenditures could not be regulated. 276
Moreover, Justice Thomas's dissent in Colorado II stated, "I continue
to believe that Buckley should be overruled. ' 277 Justice Thomas was
careful to state this was only his opinion; in making the argument
however, he did cite Justice Kennedy's recent critical review 278 of
Buckley. Therefore, regardless of the reason for their disenchant-
candidates run for office. They decide which issues make their way onto the national
agenda. They decide who wins closely contested elections.
Neuborne, supra note 271, at 179.




277. Colorado I1, 121 S. Ct. at 2371 (emphasis added).
278. Nixon v. Shrink Mo. Gov't Pac., 528 U.S. 377, 407-08 (2000) (Kennedy, J., dissenting)
(stating that "the melancholy history of campaign finance in Buckley's wake shows what can
happen when we intervene in the dynamics of speech and expression by inventing an artificial
scheme of our own" and "Buckley has not worked.").
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ment, it is clear there are at least four Justices who are clearly dissatis-
fied by Buckley. E. Joshua Rosenkranz, 279 advocating the reversal of
Buckley in favor of the Justice Stevens and Ginsburg camp, stated Jus-
tices Stephen Breyer, Souter, and Sandra Day O'Connor were the
critical three votes in determining the continuing viability of Buck-
ley.2s0 Rosenkranz further stated:
If they vote as a block, they could provide the Stevens/Ginsburg
camp with their five votes. The first two are cautious, but not at all
doctrinaire. They might just do it in the right case. Justice
O'Connor would likely be a wild card, a role she plays in many de-
mocracy-related cases.2
81
B. McCain - Feingold Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2001282
On April 2, 2001, the United States Senate passed the McCain-Fein-
gold 283 Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act (McCain-Feingold) by a
vote of 59 - 41.284 The quality of the two-week long debate in the
Senate over campaign finance reform was highly praised, and re-
sulted in a victory for the two Senators who had fought for reform
for nearly six years. 285
McCain-Feingold courageously places restrictions on issue advocacy
advertisements for the first time.286 The legislation broadens the for-
mer "express advocacy of a clearly identified candidate definition,"
with a new broader electioneering communication definition. The
new definition regulates a broadcast, cable, or satellite advertisement
that refers to a clearly identified federal candidate within sixty days of
a general election or thirty days of a primary to an audience that in-
279. E. Joshua Rosenkranz is a member of the Brennan Center for Justice at New York Uni-
versity School of Law.
280. Rosenkranz, supra note 241, at 21.
281. 1d.
282. S. 27, 107th Cong. (2001).
283. Senator Russell Feingold is a Democrat representing the State of Wisconsin.
284. George Archibald. Senate passes McCain-Feingold; opponents vow court challenge,
WASH. TIMES. Apr. 3, 2001. at Al.
285. Nancy Gibbs & Karen Tumulty, A New Day Dawning; Against all odds, the McCain-
Feingold campaign-finance-reform bill survives its toughest challenge yet. If it becomes law, how
much will change?, TIME, Apr. 9. 2001, at 40.
The two weeks of debate that ended Friday surprised many veterans of the Senate's
joyless forced marches. The debate was both civil and principled: people listened, and
some even changed their mind, persuaded by new arguments and old loyalties to make
a leap of faith. No one knew as the week went on how it would turn out; every day
brought another threat to the bill's survival, and the best head counters in the chamber
were stumped about who would act as saboteur, who would turn out to be a savior.
Id. at 42.
286. S. 27. 107th Cong. § 201(f)(3) (2001).
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cludes voters in that election.2 87 Additionally, the legislation prohibits
unions, corporations, and non-profits from funding electioneering
communications within the previously mentioned time frame, requir-
ing those types of communications to be funded with hard money
from political parties. 288 Finally, the legislation requires strict disclo-
sure and reporting requirements for issue advocacy advertisements.2 89
Another provision of McCain-Feingold affects soft money and hard
money. The legislation puts a ban on unrestricted, soft money contri-
butions to political parties and committees by wealthy individuals,
corporations, and labor unions. 290 Additionally, "[t]o offset the loss of
funding from a soft money ban, McCain-Feingold was amended to in-
crease limits on 'hard money' donations to candidates and party
committees. 29t
Finally, another major provision of McCain-Feingold is the amend-
ing of the Party Expenditure Provision.292 The legislation broadens
287. Id. The Act exempts communications found in new stories, commentaries, or editorials.
as well as communications that constitute an expenditure or independent expenditure. Id. at
§ 201(f)(3)(B).
288. Id. at § 203.
289. Id. at § 201. The legislation requires the disclosure of issue advocacy advertisements by
any spender exceeding ten thousand dollars per year, within twenty-four hours of the each ten
thousand dollar disbursement. Id. Such disclosure must include, "the identification of the
spender, custodian of the books, and any entity exercising control over activity principal place of
business: identification of disbursements of over $200: identification of donors of $1000 or more:
and notation as to election and candidates to which communications pertain." S. 27. 107th Cong.
§ 201(f)(3) (2001).
290. TITLE I
SEC. 101. SOFT MONEY OF POLITICAL PARTIES
(a) In General, Title Ill of the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971 (2 U.S.C. 431 et
seq.) is amended by adding at the end the following:
SEC. 323. SOFT MONEY OF POLITICAL PARTIES
(a) National Committees
(1) In general. A national committee of apolitical party (including a national con-
gressional campaign committee of a political party) may not solicit, receive, or
direct to another person a contribution, donation . or transfer of funds or any
other thing of value, or spend any funds, that are not subject to the limitations.
prohibitions, and reporting requirements of this Act.
(2) Applicability. The prohibition established by paragraph (1) applies to any such
national committee, any officer or agent of such a national committee, and any
entity that is directly or indirectly established, financed, maintained, or con-
trolled by such a national committee.
S. 27. 107th Cong. § 101 (2001).
291. Id. "Individuals would be allowed to contribute $2,000 per election cycle to candidates.
rather than the $1,000 that have been the limit since 1974, and that amount would be indexed to
increase in future years at the rate of inflation." Id. Additionally, state and local party commit-
tees contributions would increase from $10,000 to $20,000. national party committee contribu-
tions would increase from $40.000 to $50,000. and total individual contributions to all candidates
and political committees would increase from $50.000 to $75,000. Id.
292. Id. at § 214(b)(c).
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the definition of coordinated expenditures, which can be regulated
under FECA, thereby narrowing the definition of independent ex-
penditures, which cannot be regulated under FECA. 293 Under Mc-
Cain-Feingold, a coordinated expenditure "means a payment in
concert or cooperation with, at the request or suggestion of, or pursu-
ant to any general or particular understanding with, such candidate,
the candidate's authorized political committee, or their agents, or a
political committee, or their agents, or a political party committee or
its agents. ' 294 The legislation directs the FEC to interpret the term
"coordinated," by not specifically requiring collaboration or an overt
agreement to establish coordination. 295 Therefore, "in considering
whether 'coordination' has in fact occurred, the FEC would be al-
lowed to consider such supposedly suggestive criteria as whether the
parties share the same vendor or whether payments for the communi-
cations are being directed by a former employee of the candidate. '296
C. Shays-Meehan Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2001297
After McCain-Feingold passed the Senate, the House of Represent-
atives took up its companion bill in the House, the Shays-Meehan Bi-
partisan Campaign Reform Act of 2001 (Shays-Meehan). 298
Unfortunately for campaign finance reformers, Shays-Meehan initially
did not receive a fair vote because Speaker of the House Dennis Has-
tert proposed rules for the floor debate that the bill's supporters
thought were unfair and designed to shatter the fragile coalition sup-
porting the legislation.299 When the House rejected his rule, Speaker
Hastert withdrew the bill from consideration.3 00  Reformers in the
House then sought a discharge petition,30 1 seeking to force the leader-
293. Id.
294. S. 27, 107th Cong. § 214(b)(c) (2001). See supra note 76 and accompanying text (giving a
current definition of coordinated expenditures).
295. S. 27, 107th Cong. § 214 (2001).
296. Id. But see Campaign Finance and Freedom of Speech: Hearing Before the Subcomm. On
the Const. of the House Judiciary Comm.. 107th Cong. 441 (2001) (statement of Daniel E. Troy,
Partner, Wiley, Rein and Fielding) (arguing that McCain-Feingold coordination definition would
unconstitutionally intrude on constitutionally protected independent expenditures).
297, H.R. 2356, 107th Cong. (2001).
298, Amy Keller, Reform Hinges On Newcomers, ROLL CALL, Apr. 16, 2001, at 1. In the
106th Congress, the Shays-Meehan bill was passed by the House and received 252 votes. Id.
299. Editorial Desk, The Battle to Save Shays-Meehan, N.Y. TiMES, July 30, 2001, at A16.
300. Id.
301. Alison Mitchell, House Vote is Set on Campaign Bill, N.Y. TiMES, Jan. 25, 2002, at Al. A
discharge petition requires a majority of House members or 218 signatures to bring the bill out
of committee for a vote. Id. A discharge petition-officially a motion to discharge a committee
of its responsibilities over a given piece of legislation-is a rare parliamentary maneuver that
forces a bill out of committee and forces a bill to the floor of the full House. Id. A discharge
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ship to schedule an unobstructed, up or down floor vote on Shays-
Meehan.302 Reformers succeeded in the discharge petition and Shays-
Meehan was brought to floor of the House for consideration on Feb-
ruary 14, 2002.303 After a courageous seventeen-hour marathon de-
bate, Shays-Meehan passed the House by a vote of 240-189 at 2:43
a.m. on February 15, 2002.304 Reformers fought back a pair of alter-
nate "reform" bills30 5 and ten amendments306 by the Republican lead-
ership that would have changed the bill enough to force it into a
House-Senate Conference Committee. 30 7 The only significant amend-
ment to pass was an increase in the amount individuals could contrib-
ute directly to a candidate for federal office to $2000.308 Shays-
Meehan contains identical language to McCain-Feingold in regulation
of issue advocacy advertisements. 30 9 Supporters of reform attributed
their success to Senator McCain's presidential run and to the collapse
of Enron310 as revitalizing the need for reform.311
petition is placed in the well of the House and requires the signatures of a majority of members
of the House -218 out of 435. Id. It is considered to be one of the boldest challenges a member
of the party in power can make to that party's leadership. Id. Discharge petitions are very
rarely used in the House. Id.
Indeed since 1910, when the rule allowing discharge petitions was adopted, only two
discharge bills have become law. Yet, in recent years, discharge petitions have been
used more frequently, not so much actually to dislodge a bill from committee, but as a
threat or for leverage to get a committee or the majority party leadership to move on a
bill.
DWYRE, supra note 6, at 67.
302. See Mitchell, supra note 301.
303. Alison Mitchell, House Backs Broad Change in Financing of Campaigns; Fast Senate Ac-
tion Sought, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 15. 2002, at Al.
304. Id.
305. Representative Dick Armey (Republican, Texas) offered a substitute to "Shays-
Meehan," that would have banned all soft money activities of parties and candidates, including
those used for registration and "get-out-the-vote efforts." Juliet Eilperin & Helen Dewar, House
Defeats Finance Reform Challenges: Foes Almost out of Amendments; Shays-Meehan Backers
Near Win, WASH. POST. Feb. 14. 2002, at Al. This substitute bill failed by a vote of 249-179. Id.
Representative Bob Ney (Republican, Connecticut) also offered a substitute that would have
banned all soft money by political parties for federal election activity, increased contribution
limits for political parties and individuals, and defined and regulated express advocacy communi-
cations. Id. This substitute failed by a vote of 377-57. Id.
306. Id.
307. Mitchell, supra note 303. The Republican Amendments were described by proponents of
reform as "poison pills," which would result in a House-Senate Conference Committee that
would mean the end of any chance for meaningful reform. Id. In 1989-90 and 1993-94, both the
House and Senate passed different bills that "died" in Committee. Id.
308. Id.
309. H.R. 2356, 107th Cong. § 201 (2001). See supra notes 286-289 and accompanying text.
310. John Lancaster & Juliet Eilperin, Grass-Roots Effort Given Key Boost by Enron Scandal.
WASH. POST, Feb. 14, 2002, at A6. "'Enron gets a whole lot of credit,' said Rep. Martin T.
Meehan . . . '[t]he public knows that any past action with regard to Enron - or any future
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On March 20, 2002, the United States Senate gave final approval to
the Shays-Meehan bill by a vote of 60-40. 3 12 Senate opponents had
already conceded defeat, stating the legislation would be passed and
they were not looking for a confrontation on the issue.313 Finally, on
March 27, 2002, President Bush signed the Bipartisan Campaign Re-
form Act of 2002314 into law without ceremony. 315 The major provi-
sions of the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002 include the
narrowed definition of issue advocacy, 316 the soft money ban,317 the
narrowed definition of independent expenditures, 318 and the increased
hard money limit.319
D. Colorado II and the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002
The legislation will greatly curb contributions and expenditures to
political parties as well as issue advocacy advertisements. As previ-
ously stated, the legislation's broad definition of coordinated expendi-
tures and narrow definition of independent expenditures, along with
the ban on soft money, would limit the overall amount of money in
elections. Taken together with the Supreme Court's ruling in Colo-
rado H, the new legislation would either eliminate the excess currently
in campaigns, or force candidates to devise new ways of funding their
candidacy. Both sides have responded differently to the Court's deci-
sion in Colorado 11.320 Senator McCain indicated the ruling clearly
demonstrated the constitutionality of McCain-Feingold. 321 Oppo-
nents of campaign reform pointed out the obvious that the Court's
government action with regard to Enron - is tainted, and that government actions have less
credibility because of that money."' Id.
311. Id.
312. Allison Mitchell, Campaign Finance Bill Wins Final Approval in Congress and Bush Says
He'll Sign It: Vote is 60 to 40: Opponents of Measure say they will push Battle into Courts, TIMES,
Mar. 21, 2002, at Al.
313. Helen Dewar, Senate Foes Acknowledge Campaign Finance Bill Will Pass This Year,
WASH. POST, Feb. 27, 2002, at A7.
314. Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002, supra note 58, at § 101 et seq.
315. Elisabeth Bumiller & Philip Shenon, President Signs Bill on Campaign Gifts; Begins
Money Tour, TIMES, Mar. 28, 2002, at Al. Bush was less than enthusiastic about the bill, which
was underscored by the quiet, no-cameras signing, followed by a four-state fundraising tour ex-
pected to raise four million dollars in soft money, which the legislation will prohibit beginning
after the November, 2002, elections for Republican Congressional candidates. Id.
316. Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002, supra note 58, at § 201.
317. Id. at § 101.
318. Id. at § 214c.
319. Id. at § 102.
320. Adam Clymer, THE SUPREME COURT: CAMPAIGN MONEY; Justices Uphold
Curbs on Coordinated Political Spending, WASH. PosT, June 26, 2001, at A15.
321. Id. Supporters of the legislation will argue that based on Colorado II, because the Court
found potential for apparent corruption in party spending of regulated money on behalf of a
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ruling regarded hard money, while the current legislation deals prima-
rily with soft money.322 The ruling was also described as merely main-
taining the status quo.323 Several commentators have suggested the
role of PACs and corporations will increase substantially. 324 Addi-
tionally, independent expenditures, which are unregulated sources of
funding, will be the chief focus of candidates. 325 However, the key
part of the legislation in this area is the narrowing of the term "inde-
pendent" and the expansion of the term "coordinated," thereby de-
creasing the scope of expenditures that cannot be regulated and
limiting the ability of political parties to influence federal elections
with money.
E. The Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002 and the
United States Supreme Court
The federal courts are certain to review the legislation because Sen-
ator Mitch McConnell (R-KY), a longtime opponent of campaign fi-
nance reform, as well as numerous other organizations, have
challenged the legislation as an unconstitutional violation of the First
Amendment. 326 The legislation wisely includes a procedure for an ex-
pedited review to the U.S. District Court of the District of Columbia
for declaratory or injunctive relief, and then a direct appeal to the
U.S. Supreme Court. 327 Absent the express overruling of Buckley, the
four major provisions of The Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of
2002 are constitutional and the Supreme Court must uphold the legis-
lation. Each major provision is discussed in detail below.
1. Issue Advocacy Regulation
Both sides admit the most vulnerable provision of the legislation is
the issue advocacy regulation. 328 Because the Buckley Court inter-
preted the First Amendment to only allow for the regulation of issue
advertisements under the "express advocacy" test, the legislation can
be viewed as a rebuff to the Buckley holding. The Court is likely to
candidate, the Court would certainly see the same danger in party spending of unregulated
money. Charles Lane, Court Tests Likely for Shays-Meehan. WASH. Posi, Feb. 16, 2002, at A4.
322. Lane. supra note 321.
323. Id.
324. See Buckley. 424 U.S. at 26.
325. Leading Case. 115 HARV. L. REV. 416. 425 (2002). One commentator has suggested the
greater use of independent expenditures will result in increased negative advertisements, which
will result in a lower voter turnout. Id. Because there are few political risks associated with
third party (independent) negative advertisements this will greatly increase. Id.
326. Lane. supra note 321.
327. Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002. supra note 58, at § 403.
328. Lane. supra note 321.
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view the new, broader definition as Congress' attempt to amend the
Buckley decision. However, this really comes down to a question of
what is appropriately defined as a campaign advertisement. The de-
fense team must urge the court to realize Buckley was twenty years
ago, and what constitutes a campaign advertisement in our modern
political setting has drastically changed. The strategy of the reformers
should implicate much of the "political reality" reasoning which was
prevalent and successful in Colorado ii.329 If the Supreme Court ex-
amines what a campaign advertisement really is, the Court will find
out that these "issue ads," properly referred to by most people as
shams, are nothing but an extension of the campaign, making them
subject to FECA. The legislation provides for an alternate defini-
tion 330 similar to the current express advocacy test in the event the
Supreme Court invalidates the new definition, as well as a severability
clause. 33'
2. Soft Money Ban
The soft money ban limits only a donor's ability to contribute to a
political party and not the donor's ability to make direct expenditures.
As previously stated under the Buckley framework, regulations on
contributions require a somewhat less compelling governmental inter-
est than regulations on expenditures. 332 The soft money ban can sur-
vive strict scrutiny because it is consistent with the compelling
governmental interest of preventing corruption or the appearance of
corruption. It has been observed that soft money corrupts because it
329. See supra notes 217-272 and accompanying text.
330. Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002, supra note 58, at § 201(3)(11I)(ii). This alter-
nate definition is based on Fed. Election Comm'n v. Furgatch, 807 F.2d. 857 (9th Cir. 1987), cert
denied, 484 U.S. 850 (1987). Id. The McCain-Feingold legislation follows Furgatch and narrows
the definition of an electioneering communication to, "any broadcast, cable, or satellite commu-
nication which promotes or supports a candidate for that office, or attacks or opposes a candi-
date for that office . . . and which also is suggestive of no plausible meaning other than an
exhortation to vote for or against a specific candidate." Id. In 1995, the FEC promulgated
regulations defining "express advocacy" in a consistent manner with Furgatch. 11 C.F.R.
§ 100.222 (2000). However. several circuit courts have adhered to a narrower definition of ex-
press advocacy. See generally Me. Right to Life Comm. v. FEC, 914 F. Supp. 8 (D. Me. 1996),
aff'd per curiam, 98 F.3d. 1 (lst Cir. 1996), cert denied, 118 S. Ct. 52 (1997); FEC v. Christian
Action Network, 92 F.3d 1178 (4th Cir. 1997): Vt. Right to Life Comm. v. Sorrell, 221 F.3d 376
(2d Cir. 2000). Despite the circuit courts' rulings, the FEC has declined to revise the "express
advocacy" test. See Definition of "Express Advocacy," 63 Fed. Reg. 8363 (Feb. 19. 1998).
331. Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002. supra note 58. at § 407. The severability
clause states that if any provision of the legislation is found unconstitutional, the remainder of
the legislation is still presumed to be constitutional. Id.
332. See supra note 53.
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is usually donated in large amounts. 333 "Soft money donations are
given in such huge amounts-$50,000, $100,000, or more-that the
donors typically expect to receive something in return for any invest-
ment of this magnitude. '334 Soft money clearly implicates the quid
pro quo fears enunciated in Buckley, therefore making a ban on it
constitutional.
3. Independent Expenditure Regulation
The Supreme Court again will likely view Congress's redefinition of
coordinated and independent expenditures as an attempt to amend
the Buckley holding. However, the Court must rely on the plethora of
evidence established in Colorado II regarding the corrupting influence
of coordinated expenditures and uphold this provision. There can be
no doubt that there are few "truly" independent expenditures in the
modern political setting. The Court must recognize this political real-
ity and prevent the corruption of our governmental officials by up-
holding the Congressional restrictions.
4. Increased Hard Money Limitations
Finally, the increase in hard money contributions up to $2000 poses
no constitutional problems. Buckley established no precedent con-
flicting with an increase in hard money and focused solely on the lim-
its of hard money.
Most importantly, it must be noted that need for campaign reform
initially arose after the Watergate era, the majority of the attempted
reform was ruled unconstitutional by Buckley, and the flaws of current
system are largely a product of Buckley. The Supreme Court failed in
Buckley to remedy the numerous problems arising from the influence
of money on elections in this country. Congress has recognized this,
and it is now time for the Supreme Court to make a similar realization
and uphold the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002.
VI. CONCLUSION
A new era in American politics is upon us with meaningful cam-
paign finance reform signed into law for the first time in nearly three
decades. The struggle, however, to restore American confidence in
the democratic institutions of American has just begun. With legal
challenges certain to the new legislation, the Supreme Court must
333. Daniel M. Yarmish, The Constitutional Basis for a Ban on Soft Money. 67 FORDHAM L.
REV. 1257, 1279 (1998).
334. Id. at 1279-80.
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stand firm on the principals established in Colorado II. Chief among
those principals is the willingness to identify a political reality. The
recent legislation enacted by the Congress, is only the first step, in
what should be an end goal of a complete overhaul of the way
America funds its elections. As stated by one of this country's found-
ing fathers:
Who are to be the electors of the Federal Representatives? Not the
rich more than the poor; not the learned more than the ignorant;
not the haughty heirs of distinguished names, more than the humble
sons of obscure and unpropitious fortune. The electors are to be
the great body of the people.335
Jeremy Monteiro
335. Bonifaz. supra note 50, at 58-59 (quoting THE FEDERALIST NO. 57. 385 (James Madison)
(J.Cooke ed.. 1961)).
[Vol. 52:83
